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Abstract
In this paper we offer a response to one argument in favour of Priority Monism, what
Jonathan Schaffer calls the nomic argument for monism. We proceed in three stages.
We begin by introducing Jonathan Schaffer’s Priority Monism and the nomic argument
for that view. We then consider a response to the nomic argument that we presented
in an earlier paper (Baron and Tallant in Philos Phenomenol Res 93:583–606, 2016).
We show that this argument suffers from a flaw. We then go on to offer a different
response to the nomic argument. The core idea is that the current laws of physics
are not integrated in the manner that Schaffer requires to get the nomic argument for
monism off the ground.
Keywords Monism · Laws of nature · Quantum mechanics · General relativity ·
Holism
1 Introduction
According to contemporary versions of Priority Monism, the cosmos is the one and
only fundamental object. The position has been defended, extensively, by Jonathan
Schaffer across a range of papers: (2009, 2010a, b, 2013), among others. In Schaffer’s
words the position can be summarized, thus:
The monist holds that the whole is prior to its parts, and thus views the cosmos as
fundamental, with metaphysical explanation dangling downward from the One.
(2010a: p. 31)
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As Schaffer makes clear (2010a: p. 38), he is interested only in concrete objects.
Accordingly, Monism is the view according to which there exists a single concrete
object that is (metaphysically) basic and that is the cosmos. According to Schaffer, in
addition to basic objects, there exist derivative (or, non-fundamental) objects. These
objects are parts of the monistic whole, and include things like tables, chairs and
other familiar macroscopic objects [cf. (2010a: p. 33)]. As Schaffer also makes clear,
Priority Monism is supposed to be a necessary truth (2010a: p. 56, b: p. 321). It is
metaphysically necessary that the cosmos is the one and only fundamental object, and
since that which is ultimately prior (or ‘fundamental’) is naturally thought of as being
a substance (2010a: p. 37, fn 12), so it is metaphysically necessary that there is exactly
one fundamental substance, the cosmos, Finally, by ‘cosmos’ Schaffer (2009, 2010a:
pp. 33–35) means: spacetime. His view is that the one and only fundamental object is
an entire spatiotemporal manifold.
Schaffer (2013) then offers a particular argument for Priority Monism from two
further principles, namely:
Leibnizian Substance: Something is a substance if and only if it evolves by the
fundamental laws.
and
Russellian Laws: The cosmos is the one and only thing that evolves by the
fundamental laws.
Note that by ‘fundamental laws’ Schaffer has in mind “something familiar from
physics: Newton’s Fma and Schrodinger’s equation are historical candidates.”
(p. 68) The fundamental laws at issue, then, appear to be the laws of physics in
particular. This will become important later on. For now it is enough to flag Schaffer’s
use of the phrase ‘fundamental laws’.
From these principles it follows that:
Spinozan Monism: The cosmos is the one and only substance (2013: p. 67)
The concept of evolving via the fundamental laws can [according to Schaffer (2013)]
be elucidated as follows:
Evolving: Something evolves by the fundamental laws if and only if, for any
given time, its prediction at that time matches its behaviour.
Where ‘behaviour’ and ‘prediction’ are parsed in terms of a ‘state’ as follows:
State: The state of a thing at a time is its fundamental intrinsic character at that
time
Prediction: The prediction for a state is the temporal evolution that the fundamental
laws output on the basis of the state
Behavior: The behaviour of a thing is the temporal evolution it actually displays
Bringing this all together, Schaffer writes:
Leibnizian Substance draws on the idea of substances as integrated, and can be
understood as providing a nomic test for natural unity. To evolve by the funda-
mental laws is to act in an integrated way, forming an internally comprehensible
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and self-contained system […] The natural unity of a thing is displayed in its
dynamics. In a slogan: to be one is to act as one. (Schaffer 2013: p. 72)
Call this: the nomic argument for Priority Monism. The nomic argument forges a
critical connection between substance-hood and evolving via the fundamental laws.
The argument is, however, supposed to establish a modally strong form of Spinozan
Monism, namely the claim that Spinozan Monism is necessarily true. Call this view:
Necessary Monism (NM).
For the nomic argument to establish NM, Leibnizian Substance (LS) and Russellian
Laws (RL) must both be necessary truths. We (Baron and Tallant 2016) have argued,
however, that RL and LS cannot both be necessarily true. For if LS is true in every
world, then RL is not. We took this to be a decisive blow against the nomic argument for
priority monism. While we agree that our earlier argument succeeds in making trouble
for the nomic argument in favour of NM, we believe that there is a straightforward
fall-back position available to Schaffer that leaves a version of the nomic argument
intact. In the next section, we will briefly describe our earlier argument, and outline the
fall-back position. This will set the scene for Sect. 3 in which we provide a response
to the nomic argument for monism that cannot be avoided so easily.
2 The argument from recombination and the islands of plurality
Our original response to the nomic argument for monism appeals to a particular prin-
ciple of recombination, advocated by Bricker (1993, 1996, 2001), namely
Generalized Principle of Solitude for Particulars (GPSP): For any particular
(thick, thinned-down, or thin), possibly, a duplicate of that particular exists all
by itself.
Note that a thick particular, is, very roughly, an individual bundled with properties of
various kinds. A thin particular is an individual stripped of its properties—a so-called
‘bare’ particular. The ‘thinning down’ of a particular is the removal (via recombina-
tion) of more and more of that particular’s properties to get down to its bare nature.1
Importantly, the thinning down of a particular involves the removal of all internal and
external relations.
Given GPSP, it is a straightforward matter to show that there are worlds in which
there are at least two distinct entities that do not ‘act as one’ according to fundamental
laws; that do not satisfy ES. Here’s the idea. First, suppose that GPSP is true. Now,
take a spacetime M and use it to identify two individuals, I1 and I2. I1 is made up of
all of the objects O1 to On in a spacetime region R in M plus the spacetime relations
between those objects; I2 is made up of all of the objects O*1 to O*n (where O1
to On are all distinct from O*1 to O*n) in a spacetime region R* in M (where R is
not identical to and does not overlap R*) plus the spacetime relations between those
1 In what follows, we talk of recombination in part through metaphor. Thus, we will talk of ‘stripping
away’ or ‘removing’ particular properties or relations. Following our (2016: p. 592), we do not mean this
talk literally. As is the norm in the literature, we use such metaphors to express the idea that the resultant
worlds are possible given principles of recombination.
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objects. Importantly, neither I1 nor I2 include the spacetime relations to each other.
Second, take the mereological sum, S, of I1 and I2. Given GPSP there is a possible
world in which a duplicate of the sum S exists all by itself, where that means without
any of the spatiotemporal relations that bind I1 and I2 together and without any further
sparse external relations binding those regions together either.
Now, consider the resulting world from the perspective of the fundamental laws.
With respect to spacetime, the fundamental laws at issue are the Einstein field equa-
tions. The important part of the field equations for present purposes is the stress-energy
tensor. Very roughly, the curvature of a spacetime is a function of the distribution of
mass and energy throughout spacetime, which is partly encoded by the tensor. When
we ‘cut’ a manifold in two via the application of GPSP, we are left with two spacetimes
that have different distributions of mass and energy, resulting in different values for the
stress-energy tensor. The upshot: the two spacetimes produced by GPSP will have dif-
ferent geometric structures. This will have a range of important implications, the most
crucial of which being that gravity will behave differently in the two spatiotemporal
manifolds. In essence, then, two manifolds produced by a GPSP ‘cut’—the application
of GPSP to a single spacetime—may correspond to different solutions to the Einstein
field equations. This, in turn, will result in completely different behavior for the two
universes. One manifold might, for instance, contain a lot of mass-energy and thus
be highly curved; the other may contain very little mass-energy and thus be basically
flat.2
Schaffer says that if x and y merely co-evolve according to distinct laws L1 and
L2, then x and y do not act as one. In our (2016) example, the spacetimes do not
‘evolve as one’. Spacetime R evolves according to one solution to the field equations
(L1); Spacetime R* evolves according to a distinct solution to the field equations (L2).
Further, it does not seem that there is any candidate law, L3, according to which both R
& R* evolve. In that case, we have two distinct substances, each of which corresponds
to a different spacetime produced by a GPSP cut.
The upshot is this: if GPSP is accepted, then there are worlds that fail to be globally
integrated under fundamental laws. Rather, we have two or more entities each of which
is governed by its own group of fundamental laws. It follows that there are worlds in
which it is not the case that the cosmos is the one and only thing that evolves according
to the fundamental laws. So something’s gotta give: either Leibnizian Substance,
Necessary Monism or GPSP has to go or has to be refined. Giving up GPSP is certainly
2 What’s more, we argued (2016: p. 596), there isn’t a fundamental law that we know of according to
which both spacetimes evolve. It certainly won’t be the field equations; the field equations cannot handle
disconnected spacetimes. At best, the equations can tell you the curvature of one or more connected spaces;
it can tell you about the curvature of each spacetime individually. But the equations won’t yield a solution
for the two spacetimes together. To press the point a bit further, consider this: a GPSP cut need not produce
two spacetimes, both of which are describable by solutions to the field equations. To see this, begin with a
manifold M which has a localized region, R, that is completely flat, but where the the rest of M is curved. Now
take that region and its complement, R*, and perform a GPSP cut. The result will be: (1) one spacetime, R,
that may be describable by Newtonian mechanics, (since there won’t be any spacetime curvature to produce
the exceptions to Newton’s gravitational theory that motivate general relativity), and (2) one spacetime, R*,
that is curved and thus requires Einstein’s field equations to get gravitation right. In this situation, we have
no hope whatsoever of somehow ‘unifying’ the behavior of R and R* under a single fundamental law that
is not hopelessly gerrymandered.
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an option. As we argued, however, only a relatively weak principle of recombination
is needed to get the same result. Here ends our exegesis.
There is, however, another obvious move, and, though we originally gave it short
shrift, it is more promising than we first allowed. If we are to accept the link between
nomic integrity and substancehood (that is, if we accept Leibnizian Substance) then,
in the face of the mere possibility of island universes of the sort we described, surely
the right option is to back off from the claim that Monism is necessarily true, and look
to defend a contingent version of the thesis. In our terms: give up NM.
Now, to be sure, we argued that defending a contingent form of Monism may be
difficult. As we point out (2016: p. 594), many of the arguments that Schaffer (2010a,
b) puts forward to motivate Monism require the monistic thesis to be necessarily true,
if it is true at all. [Further, in his (2010a: p. 56) Schaffer is explicit that ‘Monism
and Pluralism, though defined as doctrines about the actual world (§1.4), are meta-
physically general theses, in the sense that whichever doctrine is true, is true with
metaphysical necessity’]. But we then concluded from this that a nomic argument for
contingent monism is no good. That’s too quick. Even if the other arguments Schaffer
martials in favour of monism no longer work for a contingent form of the view, the
nomic argument continues to be available, and provides non-trivial evidential support
for the view. A version of the nomic argument for contingent monism (CM) therefore
presents an attractive alternative for Schaffer.3 A reformulated version of the nomic
argument along these lines can be stated as follows:
1. The actual world satisfies Leibnizian Substance and Russellian Laws.
2. If the actual world satisfies Leibnizian Substance and Russellian laws, then
Monism is actually true
Therefore,
3. Monism is actually true
Schaffer’s own arguments for Russellian laws tend to focus on the actual laws of nature.
The evidence base that he has provided in favour of the view that the cosmos ‘acts as
one’ is thus already geared primarily toward establishing the actual truth of Russellian
Laws. This evidence relies on the holism displayed by quantum entanglement [see
Schaffer and Ismael (2016)]. The basic idea being that if we look to quantum mechan-
ics, and, in particular, the interplay between quantum mechanics and cosmology, then
3 There is a wrinkle here and we thank a referee for getting us to focus on it. Schaffer (2010a) can be
read as giving us something like the following argument: P1 If monism is true, monism is a metaphysical
law. P2 Metaphysical laws are true in all metaphysically possible worlds. Therefore, C, if monism is true,
it is necessary (compare, Schaffer 2010a: p. 56). For Contingent Monism to be true, one premise must
go. Which one? We’re tempted towards rejecting P1. Monism, as we imagine it here, is a thesis about
law-like integration at a world. Whether a world exhibits a structure with that kind of law-like integration is
a contingent matter. Thus, monism turns out to be a thesis, not about metaphysical law, but about a world’s
laws exhibiting a particular kind of structure. There is a useful analogy here to general relativity. The laws of
general relativity are physically necessary. Nonetheless, those laws do not mandate any particular topology
for the spatiotemporal manifold. Rather, the shape of the manifold is a contingent matter, driven by the
distribution of mass-energy. Similarly, we suppose that the metaphysical laws demand that something is
fundamental, but they do not demand that it be the entire cosmos. Rather, it is a contingent matter, to do
with the way things are arranged here that brings it about that our world (and even every physically possible
world) is a monistic world, compatible with the metaphysical laws. Exactly what that contingent feature
might be is an important question for a contingent form of monism, but not one that we will consider here.
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there is evidence that the entire cosmos is in an entangled state. The global entangle-
ment of the cosmos suggests that the fundamental laws of quantum mechanics operate
on the universe as a whole. Quantum entanglement thus imbues the universe with
an integrity by which the universe ‘acts as one’ via the laws of quantum mechanics.
Moreover, it is the only entity that is fully integrated in this manner. Any proper part
of the universe will itself be a proper part of a globally entangled system, and so the
evolution of that part will not be predictable given the laws, since it will be influenced
by entanglements that are part of the universal web of quantum states, entanglements
that must be taken into account to get fully accurate predictions.
In sum, the nomic argument for contingent monism has teeth: it avoids the prob-
lem that we raised for the nomic argument in favour of NM, and the actual truth of
Russellian laws can be defended by appealing to the physical factors involving quan-
tum holism that Schaffer has already identified, factors that do little to establish the
necessity of Russellian laws anyway.4
In what remains we will raise a problem for the nomic argument in favour of the
actual truth of priority monism. The problem, in a nutshell, is that there is good reason
to suppose that Russellian Laws is false.
3 Trouble in quantum-paradise?
Having argued that our earlier argument is ineffective against a species of monis-
m—contingent Priority Monism—that looks to be well motivated by consideration of
quantum entanglement, we instead want to replace their argument with something far
more direct. Specifically, we will argue that our current understanding of the actual
laws of nature seems to undermine the nomic argument in favour of priority monism.
To see the idea, we need to take a step back and consider the current situation
in physics. Our two most fundamental theories are quantum mechanics and general
relativity. Both theories have a dynamical form; both theories can be used to predict the
evolution of a state over time. General relativity provides an account of the dynamical
features of spacetime, via the field equations. Quantum mechanics can be used to
provide an account of the evolution of a quantum state over time via the time-dependent
Schrodinger wave equation. Neither theory is fully accurate. The trouble is that neither
theory can be made to function in a scale-invariant manner. General relativity is good
at predicting the behaviour of large-scale phenomena, but is innacurate at small scales.
Quantum mechanics is good at predicting the behaviour of small-scale phenomena,
but is innacurate at large scales.
The failure of scale invariance can lead to outright inconsistency. One particular area
where the problems associated with the lack of scale-invariance for both theories arises
is with respect to black holes. Consider two black holes: a large black hole produced
by a dying star, and a micro black hole produced in the chamber of a supercollider
(it is thought that the LHC is capable of producing micro-black holes, and generating
micro-black holes is one of the aims of scientists working with the LHC). General
4 We concede that Contingent Monism cannot appeal to the full suite of arguments that Schaffer develops
in support of NM. Nonetheless, because we think that NM is undermined by our earlier (2016) arguments,
so we think that Contingent Monism has prima facie claim to being preferable to NM.
123
Synthese
relativity is capable of predicting the behaviour of the large black hole. However, when
we scale general relativity down to the quantum scale, the predictions that general
relativity provides for a micro-black hole do not jibe with the predictions provided
by quantum mechanics. Similarly, when quantum mechanics is scaled up to try and
provide predictions regarding a large scale black hole, those predictions do not jibe
with the predictions provided by general relativity.
To be clear: we aren’t denying that, according to QM the universe has the kind of
holistic nature that Schaffer attributes to it. The point, rather, is that even if the universe
exhibits this kind of holism, QM is only part of the story and applicable only at small
scales. There is, as yet, no evidence that holism holds for large scale phenomena.
The largest recorded case of entanglement discovered to date is between two metallic
drumheads, the size of 1012 atoms each [see Ockeloen-Korppi et al. (2018)], which is
the first case of macroscopic quantum entanglement ever produced experimentally at
that scale. Of course, the universe might feature a kind of holism at every scale, but
at present that is not supported by the evidence. The point, however, is that it would
need to be in order for Schaffer’s claim that the cosmos acts as one to go through on
the basis of quantum holism alone.
In response to this idea, one might look to offer a revised account of when two
regions are to be regarded as exhibiting holism, perhaps weakening the claim to the
idea that any two regions that are connected by a chain of entanglements form a holistic
web. It would then follow, at least so argues our interlocutor, that the universe exhibits
the right kind of structure because all regions of the universe are connected by chains
of entanglement.
However, this won’t help. Even if this is true, even if all regions do exhibit this kind
of entanglement, the basic issue still remains. For though in some weak sense there
may be holism present, this holism is not scale invariant because, at the larger scales
described by GR, there is no evidence of entanglement. Indeed, this nicely brings out a
key point: we accept that all regions are connected in the way Schaffer describes. Our
point, however, is that the holism does not survive at larger scales. Since the cosmos
is large, though it may contain multitudes of entangled particles, at larger scales it
simply exhibits no such holism so far as we know and so should not be regarded as a
properly integrated whole.
So, according to Russellian Laws, the cosmos is the one and only thing that evolves
according to the fundamental laws, where what this means is that the behaviour of
the cosmos over time matches its predicted state. Given that there are two equally
fundamental theories, and thus two equally fundamental sets of physical laws, we
can pose the question: which set of laws does the cosmos evolve according to? There
appear to be three options. Either the cosmos evolves according to the laws of quantum
mechanics, or the cosmos evolves according to the laws of general relativity, or the
cosmos evolves according to the laws of both.
Suppose that the entire cosmos evolves according to the laws of quantum mechanics.
Then it is true that, at the micro scale, the behaviour of a state over time will match its
predicted behaviour. This is not, however, true at large scales. Suppose, instead, that
the entire cosmos evolves according to the laws of general relativity. Then it is true that,
at large scales, the behaviour of a state over time will match its predicted behaviour.
But this is not true at small scales. Finally, suppose that the entire cosmos evolves
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according to the laws of quantum mechanics and general relativity. Then the predicted
behaviour of at least some states at large and small scales will be inconsistent. On the
plausible assumption that no state can produce inconsistent behaviour, it follows that
the behaviour of at least some states will not match their predicted behaviour.
Given the state of our current physics, then, there is little reason to suppose that
the cosmos evolves according to the fundamental laws. The cosmos does not appear
to act as one. It appears to act as two: it behaves according to quantum mechanics at
small scales and according to general relativity at large scales. In short, if we consider
the entire cosmos, C, all of C apart from some proper part of C, C*, evolves according
to a law, L1. C*, by contrast, evolves according to a law, L2. L2 cannot be reduced to
L1 via some bridging law nor vice versa. If Leibnizian Substance is actually true then
C and C* constitute distinct substances. As Leibniz might put the point, our world
behaves like a ‘two monad world’.
There is, however, an obvious response to our argument. The argument we have
presented turns on what it is to be a fundamental law. As noted in Sect. 1, Schaffer
understands what is to be a fundamental law in terms of physics. When we look to
physics, however, we do not find any established laws by which we can plausibly say
that the entire cosmos evolves. There is, however, a concerted global effort to produce
a physical theory that retains the physical predictions of quantum mechanics at small
scales, and the physical predictions of general relativity at large scales; a theory of
quantum gravity. The hope is that a completed theory of quantum gravity will provide
the correct predictions at every scale.
One might therefore deny that we lack the evidence to suppose that the cosmos
evolves as one according to the fundamental laws of physics. After all, the cosmos
does evolve according to the fundamental laws of physics: it evolves according to
the laws of quantum gravity. By saying that the cosmos either evolves according to
quantum mechanics, general relativity or both, we have offered a false trilemma. The
correct answer is that the cosmos does not evolve according to either the laws of
quantum mechanics or the laws of general relativity.
The trouble with this response is that while there are candidate theories of quantum
gravity available—string theory, for instance—there is, as yet, no empirical evidence
in favour of any such theory. While these theories are capable of reconciling the
mathematics of quantum mechanics with the mathematics of general relativity (which
is one of the central challenges in producing a theory of quantum gravity) such theories
tend to make predictions at the Planck scale—a scale that we lack the technological
capacity to probe. There is thus, unsurprisingly, very little agreement amongst the
physics community regarding which theories of quantum gravity might be correct. As
matters stand, then, we lack the evidence needed to establish that the cosmos evolves
according to one of the theories of quantum gravity currently available. In short, we
cannot argue that monism is actually true in the absence of either scale invariant laws
or a reason to think that there are such laws. At the current time, we are not able to
articulate such laws, and we have no argument that tells us that there are such. So, once
again, if we look to physics, we do not have sufficient evidence available to establish
Russellian Laws.
Perhaps, however, we should draw a distinction between current physics and com-
pleted physics. While current physics gives us little reason to suppose that Russellian
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Laws is true, one might argue that completed physics will uphold Russellian Laws.
According to completed physics, the cosmos is the one and only thing that evolves
according to the fundamental laws, and that is enough to get the nomic argument for
CM up and running.
To be successfull, this way of developing the nomic argument must be supported
by an ancillary argument. The argument must do two things. It must establish that
final physics will be such that the entire cosmos evolves according to fundamental
law. Second, it must establish that final physics will be such that the only entity that
evolves according to fundamental law is the cosmos.
As we see it, there are but two arguments for the claim that final physics will be
such that the entire cosmos evolves according to fundamental law. First, one might
offer an a priori argument for this claim. Here is the argument. To say that physics is
‘complete’ is just to say that it provides a complete physical description of the universe,
including laws that describe how the entire universe evolves. Thus, part of what it is
for physics to be complete is for it to produce laws that describe the evolution of the
cosmos completely. It just follows from what we mean by a completed physics that it
will support Russellian Laws in this manner.
There are, however, two things one might mean by a ‘completed physics’. First, one
might mean: physics that cannot be further extended by any empirical investigation.
Second, one might mean: ideal physics regardless of whether that physics can actually
be discovered. If ‘completed physics’ means the first thing, then it by no means fol-
lows from what we mean by ‘completed physics’ that completed physics will feature
laws that describe the evolution of the entire cosmos. For it may be that empirical
investigation stops well short of producing such laws.
We may simply end up with distinct laws that operate at different scales, a la general
relativity and quantum mechanics. If, by contrast, ‘completed physics’ means ‘ideal
physics regardless of whether that physics can be discovered’, then it is far from
clear that we could ever have evidence for such a physics. Ideal physics may outrun
our capacity to understand it. It remains unclear exactly what the evidential status of
Russellian Laws is in this situation. Either way, it is difficult to see how the a priori
argument outlined above delivers the nomic argument for CM.
We might then look for an argument that is a posteriori in nature. The argument
would be based on an expectation regarding the development of physics. We can expect
some theory of quantum gravity to be vindicated in the next revolution in physics,
and so we can expect that final physics will feature that theory—or something like
it—which describes the evolution of the cosmos over time at every scale.
Merely stating such an expectation is not convincing, however. An argument needs
to be provided for why we should expect some scale invariant theory to be vindicated.
One option might be to lean on the same appearance of holism in quantum entangle-
ment that Schaffer uses to provide evidence in favour of monism. The idea would be
to argue that we can expect the same holism to persist into future physics, and so we
can expect final physics to be such that, from a quantum mechanical perspective at
least, vindicates the entire cosmos as the locus of the fundamental laws.
The trouble, however, is that the argument moves from the premise that quantum
mechanics exhibits holism, to the conclusion that what replaces quantum mechanics
and general relativity will exhibit holism. There is a perfectly good argument in the
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other direction: it is not at all clear (from anything that has been said in the literature)
that general relativity offers the kind of holism that Schaffer describes, therefore it
is unclear that what replaces quantum mechanics and general relativity will exhibit
the holism exhibited by quantum entanglement. There is no obvious advantage for
monism here.
One last concern. It might be claimed that our argument depends on the thesis that
a future Theory of Everything won’t be holistic in the way that quantum entanglement
exhibits. But that two systems are entangled is not the sort of claim that would be
undermined by a new theory, any more than the empirical evidence available of how
the planets move was undermined by General Relativity. That being so, our argument
fails.
However, we don’t suggest that quantum entanglement might be false in a future
theory. We are saying that current QM is not scale invariant and that because of this it
is not the case that the universe as a whole, at every scale, obeys the laws of QM. This
is what partly motivates the quantum gravity programme in current physics. The point
is that there is no evidence to suggest that there is one set of laws the universe in its
entirety accords to (thereby ‘acting as one’). We have evidence in favour of two groups
of laws that are restricted by scale. So we agree that the empirical results regarding
quantum correlations need to be preserved—that is a constraint on a future theory.
Schaffer needs to bet on the future theory being scale invariant and unified. And what
we do not think that we have is any compelling reason yet to think that whatever
replaces the union of quantum mechanics and general relativity will, itself, exhibit
holism at every scale.
In sum, then, it is far from clear that physics provides the needed support for
Russellian Laws. As far as current physics is concerned, the cosmos does not act as one
according to a single set of fundamental laws. There are two equally fundamental laws
that fail to be fully accurate at every scale. With respect to future physics, an argument
is needed to support the expectation that final physics will support Russellian Laws.
While an argument may be developed along these lines, there is a substantial amount
of work to be done to get any argument along these lines off the ground. As the debate
stands, then, there is not enough evidence to support the actual truth of Russellian
Laws, and thus to scaffold the argument for contingent priority monism.
4 Conclusion
Monism is the view that the one substance is fundamental. We have argued that there
is good evidence that the current laws do not motivate even a contingent version of
monism. Since the failure of a contingent form of monism implies the failure of a
necessary form of monism as well, it follows that there is no viable nomic argument in
favour of monism. The argument we have presented here thus provides a more powerful
response to the nomic argument than does our earlier (2016) argument. That argument,
at best, undermines the nomic argument for NM. Our new argument undermines the
nomic argument for priority monism simpliciter.5
5 We’re very grateful to referees for Synthese for their comments on previous versions of this submission.
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